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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Joseph Sheridan appeals from the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion.
Sheridan claims that his sentence is illegal on the face of the record.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On July 19, 1997, Sheridan shot and killed Chris Niendorf. (R., pp. 138-140.) The state
charged Sheridan with the murder of Mr. Niendorf and with aggravated assault on Mr.
Niendorf’s wife, Twyla. (Id.) A jury acquitted Sheridan of first and second degree murder, but
found him guilty of manslaughter and the aggravated assault charge. (Id.) In addition, the jury
found Sheridan guilty of a deadly weapon enhancement for both convictions. (Id.)
After the jury verdicts finding him guilty, the district court ordered a new trial because the
bailiff made inappropriate comments during jury deliberations. (Id.) Prior to his retrial, Sheridan
moved to dismiss the charges on double jeopardy grounds. (Id.) The district court determined
that Sheridan could not be retried on the first and second degree murder charges, but held that he
could be retried for manslaughter, aggravated assault and the deadly weapon enhancement. (Id.)
On retrial, a jury again found Sheridan guilty of manslaughter and the deadly weapon
enhancement. (Id.) The jury found Sheridan not guilty of aggravated assault. (Id.) On March
27, 2000, the district court sentenced Sheridan to twenty-five years with fifteen years fixed. (Id.)
On October 28, 2002, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Sheridan’s convictions. (Id.) The
Idaho Supreme Court denied Sheridan’s petition for review. (Id.)
On May 14, 2003, Sheridan filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (Id.) Included in
his post-conviction petition was his double jeopardy claim. (Id.) The district court dismissed
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Sheridan’s petition, including the double jeopardy claim. (Id.) Sheridan appealed. (Id.) The
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. (Id.)
On July 18, 2016 Sheridan filed a Rule 35 Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence
because he claimed his retrial violated double jeopardy and thus the district court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction over the retrial. (Id.) Sheridan’s case was transferred to Freemont
County. (Id.) The state moved to dismiss Sheridan’s motion. (R., pp. 36-49.) On August 22,
2016, and May 25, 2017, the district court conducted hearings during which Sheridan fired two
separately appointed public defenders. (R., pp. 138-144.) Sheridan decided to proceed pro se.
(Id.)
On July 20, 2017, the district court held another hearing regarding Sheridan’s Rule 35
motion. (Id.) “At the hearing, Sheridan asserted the basis for his motion was issues of subject
matter jurisdiction and double jeopardy.” (Id.) The district court found that, on the face of the
record, Sheridan’s sentence was not illegal. (R., pp. 142-144.) The district court determined that
Sheridan’s assertions were not supported by the record. (Id.) The court reasoned:
Sheridan was convicted of manslaughter and a weapons enhancement.
Sheridan is currently serving a sentence related to the manslaughter conviction
and the sentence imposed by the District Court, not a conviction and sentence
related to the previously acquitted charge of murder. Despite Sheridan’s
assertions in the motion before this Court, the District Court’s (Wood) decision
permitted Sheridan to be tried on manslaughter charges subsequent to the mistrial
and not a retrial on the acquitted charges of murder charges [sic]. Sheridan was
never acquitted of the manslaughter offense. Hence, there is no violation of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution nor Article I, Section 13 of the
Idaho Constitution.

(Id.) The district court found that Sheridan’s sentence was not illegal on its face and denied his
Rule 35 motion. (Id.) The district court found:
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The district court imposed a sentence that was within the parameters
allowable under the statute to which Sheridan was convicted. Moreover, as
provided in the authority above, Rule 35 is not a vehicle designed to reexamine
the facts underlying the case to determine whether a sentence is illegal. The rule
only applies to a narrow category of cases in which the sentence imposes a penalty
that is simply not authorized by law. As such, [Sheridan’s] claim for relief under
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 fails.
(R., pp. 142-143.) Sheridan timely appealed. (R., pp. 148-152.)
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ISSUES
Sheridan states the issues on appeal as:
(1).
Can Appellant be ordered to be retried on (all charges) when he was
acquitted of first and second degree murder.
(1)(a). Can the death penalty be discussed in open court (pertaining to second
trial) after Appellant was acquitted of first and second degree murder.
(1)(b). Did the district court err when the state’s motion for summary judgment
was granted.
(1)(c). Was the second trial and subsequent sentencing hearing (void).
(2).
Was Appellant convicted of any offense, when the record shows no
conviction entered (mistrial declared).
(2)(a). Was Appellant convicted. District court held on (July 20, 2017), no
conviction entered (first trial).
(2)(b). Appellant contends district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
(2)(c). Sentencing hearing void.
(3).
The state cited Idaho Code § 19-4906, as its basis for dismissal. Appellant
sought relief under Idaho Criminal Rule 35.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5 (capitalization altered for readability).) In his supplemental briefing
Sheridan restates the issues on appeal as:
(1).
It is a question of law as to whether the District Court can order Sheridan
to be re-tried on (all charges) after he was (acquitted) of first and second degree
murder.
(1)(a). It is a question of law as to whether the death penalty can be used to
intimidate Sheridan after he was acquitted of first and second degree murder.
(1)(b). Did the District Court err on (July 28, 2017), when the State’s (motion for
Summary Dismissal) was granted (vol. I. R., PP. 145).
(2).
It is a question of law as to whether Sheridan was convicted of any offense
at the first trial.
(2)(b). Did the District Court err by not addressing the fact that the face of the
record, and the (ROA) documented Sheridan was not convicted of any offense at
the first trial, i.e. mistrial declared on (4-04-1999).
3.
Did the District Court have subject matter jurisdiction to convict Sheridan
of first or second degree murder or second degree murder, after he was previously
(acquitted) of those offenses.
(Appellant’s Supp. brief, p. 5.)
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The state consolidates and rephrases the issue as:
Has Sheridan failed to show the district court erred when it denied his Rule 35 motion to
correct an illegal sentence?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Sheridan’s Rule 35 Motion Because His
Sentence Is Not Illegal From The Face Of The Record
A.

Introduction
The district court found that Sheridan’s sentence was not illegal on its face and denied his

Rule 35 motion. (See R., pp. 138-143.) On appeal Sheridan argues the district court erred
because he claims the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over his retrial
because the retrial violated his double jeopardy rights.

(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6,

Appellant’s Supp. brief, pp. 6-7.) Sheridan’s argument is not supported by law or the record.
First, subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by the charging instrument and double
jeopardy rights do not remove jurisdiction from a district court. Second, Sheridan was not retried
on the acquitted murder charge, but rather was retried, after a mistrial, on a manslaughter charge.
(See R., pp. 138-140.) A defendant may be retried after a mistrial. There was no double
jeopardy violation. And finally, Sheridan’s argument is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Sheridan’s double jeopardy claim has been repeatedly raised and adjudicated.

Sheridan’s

sentence is not illegal on its face and the district court did not err when it denied his Rule 35
motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court freely reviews a district court’s ruling on an Idaho Criminal Rule 35

motion to correct an illegal sentence. State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 840, 291 P.3d 1036,
1039 (2013) (citing State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 601, 261 P.3d 853, 878 (2011)).
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C.

Sheridan Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Concluding That His Sentence
Is Not Illegal From The Face Of The Record
The district court properly denied Sheridan’s Rule 35 motion because Sheridan’s sentence

is not illegal from the face of the record. An Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion may be used to
contest only those sentences that are illegal from the face of the record. McKinney, 153 Idaho at
840, 291 P.3d at 1039 (citing State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 86, 218 P.3d 1143, 1147 (2009)).
A sentence is illegal from the face of the record only if the illegality can be determined without
resolving significant questions of fact or conducting an evidentiary hearing. Id. (citing Clements,
148 Idaho at 86, 218 P.3d at 1147).

Even reviewing a preliminary hearing transcript is

“significant fact-finding” and beyond the scope of a Rule 35 motion. Id.
Sheridan argues that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over his
retrial and sentencing because the “district court ordered Sheridan to be tried twice of all charges,
even though Sheridan was acquitted of first and second degree murder.” (Appellant’s brief, p.
6(B) (capitalization altered); see also Appellant’s Supp. brief, p. 6 (“Sheridan contends the
District Court lacked Subject Matter jurisdiction, subsequently the Second trial and sentencing
hearing were void proceedings, legally null, illegal sentence.”).) Sheridan clarified that this was
a subject matter jurisdiction argument. (See 7/20/17 Tr., p. 60, Ls. 15-18 (“I would just want to
make things real clear that this is a subject matter jurisdiction argument.”), p. 76, L. 21 – p. 77, L.
4.) Sheridan’s argument that the district court loses subject matter jurisdiction when there is
potential double jeopardy violation is without merit.
The subject matter jurisdiction of a district court in a criminal case is well-established.
The charging document is the instrument that confers subject matter jurisdiction on a court, and
whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction depends upon whether the charging document is

7

legally sufficient. See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 708, 215 P.3d 414, 428 (2009). “An
indictment or an information confers jurisdiction if it alleges that the defendant committed a
criminal offense within the state of Idaho.” State v. Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, 298, 297 P.3d
257, 261 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing Severson, 147 Idaho at 708, 215 P.3d at 428; State v. Jones, 140
Idaho 755, 757-58, 101 P.3d 699, 701-02 (2004)). Sheridan does not argue that the charging
instrument failed to allege he committed a criminal offense within the state of Idaho. Therefore,
Sheridan has failed to show the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Sheridan’s
argument that double jeopardy rights can somehow implicate the district court’s subject matter
jurisdiction is without merit or legal support.
Even if Sheridan’s double jeopardy argument is considered, it is not supported by law or
the record. Sheridan claims that because he was acquitted of first and second degree murder at
the first trial, a trial that ended in a mistrial, he could not be convicted of manslaughter,
aggravated assault and the deadly weapon enhancement on a retrial. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.
4-6; see also Appellant’s Supp. brief, pp. 6-7.)

The basis of Sheridan’s double jeopardy

argument is fundamentally flawed.
It is well established that, after a mistrial is declared, a defendant may be retried on any
charges of which he was not acquitted. See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 126 Idaho 822, 825-827, 892
P.2d 889, 892-984 (1995) (explaining the different standards under which a defendant may be
retried after a mistrial); State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 344, 127 P.3d 954, 960 (2005) (a
defendant may be retried after a mistrial); see also Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 466467 (2005) (if jury returns a guilty verdict that is later set aside, double jeopardy does not prevent
a prosecutorial appeal); State v. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 221, 224, 307 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App.
2013) (noting that defendant was convicted, on retrial, following two separate mistrials).
8

Here, Sheridan’s first trial ended in a mistrial. (R., p. 138.) At his first trial he was not
acquitted of voluntary manslaughter or the weapons enhancement. (See R., p. 138.) The district
court found that Sheridan was never acquitted of manslaughter; thus there was no double
jeopardy violation and Sheridan’s sentence was not illegal on its face. (See R., pp. 142-143.)
The district court did not err. From the face of the record Sheridan’s retrial for voluntary
manslaughter and the weapons enhancement did not violate double jeopardy.
Further, Sheridan’s reliance on the district court’s statement that there was not a
conviction in the first trial is misplaced. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 6(B); see also Appellant’s
Supp. brief, p. 6(E).) It is clear from the record that the district court did not say Sheridan was
acquitted of all charges after the first trial. (See 7/20/17 Tr., p. 61, L. 19 – p. 68, L. 16, p. 78, L.
11 – p. 80, L. 1.) Rather, the district court was explaining that, because the first trial was
declared a mistrial, the first trial did not result in any ultimate convictions. (Id.) The mistrial
vacated the original first trial guilty verdicts and permitted Sheridan to be retried on those
offenses. (See id.) For example, the district court explained:
But I want you and the record to know that the Court has gone through this
very carefully. Anything that has been submitted has been reviewed and digested.
The charge came also some time later, in – in 1997, September 22nd.
We’ve had discussions today about that first trial, January 19th, 1999; the
conviction that followed on January the 30th of 1999.
And I – I want to clarify. When I use the term “conviction,” I don’t want
Mr. Sheridan to fall – believe that the Court has fallen into what he is
characterizing as a trap of – of conviction.
I understand very quick – clearly what occurred in that case. And – and
there was no conviction entered as a result of that trial.
And we – we know, through the history, whether it’s through the ROA or
the record itself, that – that there was no conviction ultimately.
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And I think both attorneys understand, Mr. Sheridan, rather that there was
a mistrial.
A new trial took place on the 31st of March, 1999, at least one setting for
that, and then 11/30/1999, with a conviction, taking place on 12/10/1999.
(7/20/17 Tr., p. 63, L. 7 – p. 64, L. 3.)
Sheridan also claims that it is a “question of law” whether the state could pursue the death
penalty after he was acquitted of first and second degree murder. (Appellant’s Supp. brief, p. 6.)
He states, that prior to his retrial, his defense counsel “mentions (death penalty) five times, as he
inquires as to whether ‘the state will be seeking the death penalty or not[.]’” (Appellant’s Supp.
brief, p. 6 (citing Ex. A at p. 61, Ls. 11-12.).) Exhibit A appears to be a transcript from an April
18, 1999 hearing wherein Sheridan’s counsel appeared to be explaining to the district court why
Sheridan may need new counsel for the retrial. (See Ex. A.) Sheridan’s counsel explained to the
district court that he was not sure that Sheridan would be able to pay the costs of the retrial,
especially if the state would be pursuing the death penalty. (See Ex. A.) The Exhibit cuts off
prior to the state’s response. (See Ex. A.) It does not appear that Sheridan raised this claim
before the district court. (See R., pp. 138-144; see also 7/20/17 Tr., p. 39, L. 10 – p. 50, L. 5, p.
52, L. 2 – p. 56, L. 17, p. 57, L. 12 – p. 60, L. 18.) “Idaho appellate courts will not consider
issues raised for the first time on appeal.” State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396
P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (citing Mickelsen Const., Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396, 405, 299 P.3d
203, 212 (2013); Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 812, 252 P.3d 71, 93
(2011)). Because this claim was not preserved before the district court this Court should not
consider it.
Even if this Court considers this claim preserved, this Court should still not consider it
because it requires this Court to look beyond the face of the record, and is not within the scope of
10

a Rule 35(a) motion. See McKinney, 153 Idaho at 840, 291 P.3d at 1039 (citations omitted).
Further, Sheridan also fails to support this claim with a proposition of law, authority or argument.
See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“When issues on appeal are
not supported by proposition of law, authority or argument, they will not be considered.”).
Sheridan does not explain how his attorney’s argument regarding potential new counsel would
somehow remove the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. (See Appellant’s Supp. brief, p.
6.) Nor is there evidence in the record that the state was pursuing the death penalty on the retrial
or even could do so. (See R., generally). Sheridan’s claim that his attorney’s statements, during
a hearing about potential new counsel, somehow divested the district court of subject matter
jurisdiction is not supported by a proposition of law, authority or argument. This claim was also
not raised before the district court and is without merit.
The district court reviewed Sheridan’s claims and did not find any “jurisdictional
problem” or double jeopardy issue that barred Sheridan’s retrial. (7/20/17 Tr., p. 67, Ls. 14-20,
p. 79, Ls. 6-9.) From the face of the record the district court did not err.

1.

Sheridan’s Double Jeopardy Claims Are Barred By Res Judicata

The state responded to Sheridan’s Rule 35 motion by arguing, in part, that his double
jeopardy claim was barred by res judicata. (See R., pp. 36-49.) 1 The district court recognized

1

Sheridan argues that the state “forfeited the (motion for summary dismissal)” because the state
cited Idaho Code § 19-4906 and he had filed a Rule 35 motion, not a post-conviction action.
(See Appellant’s brief, p. 6(c).) Sheridan does not explain or provide any law how a citation,
even one that is not directly applicable, can “forfeit” a motion. Thus this argument should not be
considered. See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970 (“When issues on appeal are not
supported by proposition of law, authority or argument, they will not be considered.”).
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the state’s res judicata argument but did not rule on it. (See R., p. 142.) Idaho appellate courts
can affirm an order of the district court upon grounds other than those relied on by the district
court. See Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at 275, 396 P.3d at 704 (citing Idaho Sch. for Equal
Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 580, 850 P.2d 724, 731 (1993) (referencing the
“right result-wrong theory” rule)). In this case, the district court’s theory was correct; however,
the district court can also be affirmed on alternate res judicata grounds raised by the state below
“Res judicata precludes re-litigation of issues that have been previously decided in a final
judgment or decision in an action between the same litigants.” State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 63,
343 P.3d 497, 505 (2015) (citing State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d 481, 482
(2000)). “[A] valid final judgment rendered on the merits is an absolute bar to a subsequent
action between the same parties on the same claim.” Id. (citing Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho
92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002)). In order to determine “sameness” for the purposes of res
judicata, Idaho appellate courts examine “the operative facts underlying the two causes of
action.” Id. (citing Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 149, 804 P.2d 319, 322
(1990)). “A valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of
the same transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose.” Id.
(quoting Diamond, 119 Idaho at 150, 804 P.2d at 323). “Therefore, res judicata’s preclusive
effect bars ‘not only subsequent re-litigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent
re-litigation of any claims relating to the same cause of action which were actually made or
which might have been made’ in the first suit.” Id. (citing Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d
at 805).
Sheridan has repeatedly made the same double jeopardy argument on which his Rule 35
motion was based. After the mistrial, “Sheridan moved to dismiss the charges based upon the
12

double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section
13 of the Idaho Constitution.” (R., p. 139.) The district court denied Sheridan’s double jeopardy
motion. (Id.) After his conviction on retrial, Sheridan appealed. (Id.) Sheridan attempted to
raise the double jeopardy claim during oral argument, but because the claim was not properly
before the court the Idaho Court of Appeals did not consider it. (Id.) Because res judicata bars
the re-litigation “of any claims...which might have been made” Sheridan’s double jeopardy
claim, which could have been properly made on his first appeal, is barred by res judicata.
Sheridan then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 139-140.) In his postconviction petition, Sheridan again made the double jeopardy claim. (R., p. 140.) The district
court dismissed Sheridan’s double jeopardy claim. (Id.) Sheridan appealed. (Id.) The Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed. (Id.) Sheridan’s double jeopardy claim has thus actually been finally
litigated and, as such, is barred by res judicata. While the district court did not err when it
denied Sheridan’s Rule 35 motion on the grounds articulated in its written decision, this Court
can also affirm the order of the district court on this alternate ground.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the decision of the district court.
DATED this 12th day of September, 2018.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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